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The Second Punic War is a relatively well-known episode from Roman 
history. Reliable, detailed ancient sources such as Livy and Polybius, 
however, don’t say much on the topic of Hannibal’s provisions. The 
authors of this paper believe that Hannibal’s path to Cannae was part 
of a premeditated military plan, according to which the Carthaginian 
army needed to pick up supplies near Cannae, with the Liburnians 
playing an important role. Facts supporting this theory are examined 
in the paper, with a close examination of the two most important lite-
rary sources on the topic, Livy and Polybius, reexamined in the light of 
recent archaeological findings from the Liburnian region.
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sions, elephants
Obraz Hannibala jest skomplikowaną mozaiką – P. Matusiak begins 
her study on Hannibal with these words,2 and nothing less could 
be said of the war that made him famous.
1  Daniel Nečas Hraste (August 15th, 1959-November 1st, 2018), classical philologist, 
our dear friend and colleague of many years, a great lover of Livy. He participated in 
the creation of the idea for this paper, but soon after proposing the paper for the con-
ference held in Pula in 2018, he fell ill with an illness that took his life much too soon, 
and he was unable to attend, passing away days after the conference. We would like to 
dedicate this article to him, with love.
2  Matusiak 2015: 9. The study offers a detailed analysis of the description of the 
character of Hannibal as it is given in ancient literature, from various aspects (such as 
Hannibal Poenus, Hannibal hostis, Hannibal dux, Alter Hannibal). See also Hoyos 2003.
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The Second Punic War (219-202 BC), rightfully also called Hanni-
bal’s War in literature, is a relatively well-known episode of Roman 
history.3 Otherwise reliable sources such as Livy or Polybius don’t tell 
us much about Hannibal’s supplies and the reinforcements from his 
native Carthage. The question of his supplies must have formed part 
of his tactical planning and operative concept. The strategic goals 
of different parts of his war campaign, much like the wider strategic 
goals of his warpath are even today the subject of academic debate, 
which ranges from the view that Hannibal’s ultimate goal was the 
complete defeat of Rome to the view that his goal was limited, in 
political terms, to the dissolution of the alliance of Italian cities with 
Rome.4 It is precisely his relationship with Rome’s allies, along with 
Hannibal’s impressive character,5 that is the most striking feature 
of this war; on the one hand, viewing it from the position of Rome, 
because the strength of the Roman army secured, as an instrument 
of sanction, the political authority of the Roman Republic within the 
3  There are various literary sources from which we have data on the Second Punic 
War. The most expansive of these are the works from historiographers (Polybius, 
Livius, Florus, Appian, Dio Cassius, and to a lesser degree Aurelius Maximus, Velleius 
Paterculus) and biographers (Cornelius Nepos, Plutarchus, and to a lesser degree Au-
relius Victor), along with the literary works belonging to authors of various different 
genres (Plautus, Cicero, Silius Italicus).
4  Bagnall 2002: 56: “Whether this plan was conceived with a measured intellectu-
al approach or, as seems more probable, opportunistically and pragmatically, is not 
known, but however arrived at, it was both grandiose and imaginative in its design. 
We already know Hannibal’s operational concept for isolating Rome from her allies, 
but we need to look briefly at his wider strategic concept for the encirclement of 
the Italian peninsula.” Healy 1994: 12: “The crux of Hannibal’s strategy – for his 
invasion of Italy was never predicated on the assumption that Rome’s defeat could 
be secured solely by military means. His employment of his army was above all dire-
cted towards the realization of an explicitly political aim. By invading Italy, Hannibal 
sought to undermine Roman power by destroying the political confederation that 
linked the Republic with her allies.” See also Hoyos 2008. and Fields 2010. A compa-
rative analysis of the strategies of both sides of the war can be found in Parker 2001.
5  Nor can Livy in his restrained decription, despite the general pro-Roman ten-
dentioness of his Historiae, hide his admiration of the Carthaginian general: “nunqu-
am ingenium idem ad res diversissimas, parendum atque imperandum, habilius fuit. 
Itaque haud facile discerneres utrum imperatori an exercitui carior esset; neque Ha-
sdrubal alium quemquam praeficere malle, ubi quid fortiter ac strenue agendum es-
set, neque milites alio duce plus confidere aut audere. Plurimum audaciae ad pericula 
capessenda, plurimum consilii inter ipsa pericula erat; nullo labore aut corpus fatigari 
aut animus vinci poterat; caloris ac frigoris patientia par; cibi potionisque desiderio 
naturali non voluptate modus finitus; vigiliarum somnique nec die nec nocte dis-
criminata tempora; id quod gerendis rebus superesset quieti datum; ea neque molli 
strato neque silentio accersita; multi saepe militari sagulo opertum humi iacentem 
inter custodias stationesque militum conspexerunt. Vestitus nihil inter aequales 
excellens; arma atque equi conspiciebantur. Equitum peditumque idem longe primus 
erat; princeps in proelium ibat, ultimus conserto proelio excedebat”. (Liv. XXI 4, 3-9).
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alliance, and because the allies bound to Rome with contractual obli-
gations filled the Roman army; on the other hand, from the viewpoint 
of Carthage, due to the fact that the entire plan relied on Hannibal’s 
success and, with the exception of victory over the Roman army in 
open battles, on the reaction and coaxing of allies to defect from 
Rome in order to ensure that the troops were manned, as well with 
as all the accompanying military logistics. In this paper, therefore, 
along with the issue of supply, we also link the issue of Hannibal’s 
possible communications with his native Carthage.
THE MATHEMATICS OF ELEPHANTS
One of the questions regarding supply is the question of where Hanni-
bal’s elephants came from after the battle of Cannae in 216 BC. When 
he crossed the Pyrenees and the river Rhône in 218 in a swift march,6 
Hannibal also had a brigade of 37 elephants in his army.
Livy reports the testimony of a former prisoner of Hannibal’s, 
stating that when crossing the Rhône, Hannibal also lost some 
horses and draft animals, without specifying neither which type 
nor how many (Liv. XXI 38, 3-5: L. Cincius Alimentus, qui captum 
se ab Hannibale scribit..., ex ipso autem audisse Hannibale, postquam 
Rhodanum transierit, triginta sex milia hominum ingentemque numerum 
equorum et aliorum iumentorum amisisse).7
6  On the difficulties and technicalities of the crossing of the Rhône river: Polyb. 
III 47, 12; Liv. XXI 28, 5-10; Plin. VIII 28; Wilkinson 1911: 14-17; Edwards 2001; on the 
transportation of the elephants across the river see Nossov 2008: 22: “When Ptolemy 
I (r. 305-283 BC) heard that there were plenty of elephants to the south of Egypt, in 
the lands of modern Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, he ordered the delivery 
of elephants to be organized for his army. The Kushites (Ethiopians), inhabiting the 
area at that time tamed elephants but are not known to have used them in combat. 
The Ptolemies sent one expedition after another, each comprising several hundred 
soldiers. Special ships combining high freight-carrying capacity with a shallow draft 
for river travel were built to transport the captured elephants. Ancient commentators 
state that Ptolemy II Philadelphus (r. 285-46 Be) already had at least 300 African elep-
hants in his corps. Some of the drivers were Kushites, but most were recruited in India, 
where Ptolemy II sent special envoys.” Comparatively, Livy describes the crossing of 
the Rhône in the section above: “Ratem unam ducentos longam pedes, quinquagin-
ta latam a terra in amnem porrexerunt, quam, ne secunda aqua deferretur, pluribus 
validis retinaculis parte superiore ripae religatam pontis in modum humo iniecta con-
straverunt, ut beluae audacter velut per solum ingrederentur. Altera ratis aeque lata, 
longa pedes centum, ad traiciendum flumen apta, huic copulata est; tum elephanti per 
stabilem ratem tamquam viam praegredientibus feminis acti”. (Liv. XXI 28, 7-8).
7  All citations from Livy are cited according to Titi Livi Ab Urbe Condita (Libri XXI-
XXV), eds. Charles Flamstead Walters and Robert Seymour Conway, Oxford 1929.
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In his legendary and painstaking crossing of the Alps, Hannibal suffe-
red great losses, for the most part among his infantry. Speaking of 
the number of soldiers and accompanying animals which survived the 
crossing of the Alps and arrived in Northern Italy, Polybius and Livy offer 
differing information,8 and the route upon which Hannibal moved as 
well as the real, numerically expressed losses are even today a topic 
of debate and academic speculation.9 Further warfare led Hannibal to 
Trebbia where he clashed with the Romans in a battle that would be 
the first of three (Trebbia, Trasimene, Cannae), tactically brilliant in the 
Roman execution line.10 A certain number of elephants survived the 
battle, and after the Battle of Trebbia, according to Livy, Hannibal suffe-
red great losses to his men, horses, as well as elephants in the fierce 
storm that hit the Carthaginian army as it crossed the Apennines. In the 
source it is written seven of the elephants which survived the Battle of 
Trebbia perished in the storm: multi homines, multa iumenta, elephanti 
quoque ex iis qui proelio ad Trebiam facto super fuerant septem absumpti. 
[Many men and many horses perished, and seven of the elephants that 
had survived the battle on the Trebia.] Livy XXI 58, 11.11
Livy’s account of Hannibal’s movements immediately after the Battle 
of Trebbia is challenged by some historiographers.12 After the battle, 
Hannibal decided to go through the Etruscan swamp, which the Romans 
believed to be impassable due to the overflowing waters of the Arno 
8  Cf. Polyb. III 55, 5 and Liv. XXI 38, 2-3.
9  Briscoe 2008: 47: “There has been enormous controversy about the route by which 
Hannibal crossed the Alps. The balance of probability is in favour of the view that Hanni-
bal arrived in Italy in the area of Turin (in mid-October, about a month-and-a-half after 
crossing the Rhone), and if this is so the choice for Hannibal’s pass lies between Mt Ge-
nevre, Mt Cenis and, the solution preferred by the two most recent writers, the Col de 
Clapier. Hannibal had incurred considerable losses on his journey from Spain, though, as 
so often with troop numbers, the precise extent of the casualties cannot be measured.”
10  Some contemporary historiographers believe that the Carthaginian army, despite 
the harsh winter and the long and exhausting crossing of the Alps, was better prepared 
than the Roman army in the Battle of Trebbia. See Miles 2011: 94: “Although the whole 
Roman force forded the river and drew up into their battle lines in good order, the tro-
ops were cold, wet and hungry after being mobilized before they had breakfasted. In 
contrast, the Carthaginian troops had been well prepared and fed.”
11  All translations of Livy in this paper are cited from: Livy, History of Rome, Volume VI: 
Books 23-25, transl. J.C. Yardley, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Cambridge 2014, 
and Livy, History of Rome, Volume V: Books 21-22, transl. J.C. Yardley, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Cambridge 2019.
12  Referring to Liv. XXI 58-59,9, “Livy’s story of an attempt by Hannibal to cross the 
Appennines immediately after the battle of the Trebbia and of a drawn battle between 
Hannibal and Sempronius is to be rejected.” (Briscoe 2008: 49).
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River. In that crossing, Hannibal, likely suffering from an allergy and 
having an infection in one eye that he could not treat in those condi-
tions, lost his eye. The source tells us that after the crossing through 
the Etruscan wetlands only one elephant of the initial 37 was left:
ipse Hannibal aeger oculis ex uerna primum intemperie uariante 
calores frigoraque, elephanto, qui unus superfuerat, quo altius ab 
aqua exstaret, uectus, uigiliis tamen et nocturno umore palustrique 
caelo grauante caput et quia medendi nec locus nec tempus erat 
altero oculo capitur.
[Hannibal himself, whose eyes were suffering in the first place from 
the trying spring weather, alternating betwixt hot and cold, rode 
upon the sole surviving elephant, that he might be higher above 
the water. But lack of sleep, damp nights, and the air of the mars-
hes affected his head, and since he had neither place nor time for 
employing remedies, he lost the sight of one of his eyes.] Livy XXII 
2, 10-11.
The Battle of Lake Trasimene ensued, in which the Romans were 
caught in the narrow passage by the lake, badly defeated, and suffe-
red great losses. After the battle, Hannibal marched through Umbria 
and across the Apennines, breaking through to the the Adriatic Sea by 
Picenum. This arrival at the Adriatic coast is of great significance for 
many reasons, as Hannibal with it gained access to the sea for the first 
time after two years of the war campaign. It is important to emphasize 
here that, according to Polybius’ report, Hannibal sent messengers to 
Carthage as soon as he arrived at the Adriatic coast to report on the 
achievements they had made and to request reinforcements. We have 
no news as to whether or not these reinforcements came and when 
they would have arrived:
ὡς ἂν γεγονὼς κύριος τοσούτων σκύλων. ἐξαπέστειλε δὲ κατὰ 
θάλατταν ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ καὶ τοὺς διασαφήσοντας εἰς τὴν 
Καρχηδόνα περὶ τῶν γεγονότων· τότε γὰρ πρῶτον ἥψατο θαλ
άττης, ἀφ’ οὗ τὴν εἰσβολὴν ἐποιήσατο τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν. ἐφ’ οἷς
ἀκούσαντες μεγαλείως ἐχάρησαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ πολλὴν 
ἐποιοῦντο σπου δὴν καὶ πρόνοιαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ πάντα τρόπ
ον ἐπικουρεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράγμασι.13
13  Polybius, Polybii historiae, Vols. 1-4, ed. Teubner Büttner–Wobst, Leipzig, 1905.
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[… being, as he now was, in possession of a very large quantity of 
captured arms. He also sent at this time messengers to Carthage by 
sea with the news of what had happened, this being the first time he 
had come in touch with the sea since he invaded Italy. The news was 
received with great rejoicing by the Carthaginians, who hastened to 
take steps to support in every possible manner the two campaigns in 
Italy and in Spain.] Polyb. III 87.3-88.2.14
Continuing his war plan, on the road to the south, Hannibal held 
the regions along the Adriatic coast; the importance of this fact 
with regard to this paper will be elucidated later in the text. Imme-
diately following his victory at Cannae in 216 BC,15 Hannibal enters 
Samnium along with his army, where the city of Comps surrende-
red to him with no resistance, and it is here that he divides his army 
into two. Mago takes over part of the command, whom Hanni-
bal orders to take over cities in the region who had defected from 
Rome, and to report his victory to Carthage, along with a request 
for logistics. Hannibal himself penetrates into Campania in an effort 
to obtain the coast as well as the opportunity to invade Neapolis 
in order to secure a seaport and safe passage from which Carthagi-
nian ships could deliver reinforcements. The Carthaginian senate, 
having heard Mago’s report16 and considered their options, decides 
to send military aid to Hannibal, among which 4000 Numidians and 
40 elephants:
itaque ingenti consensu fit senatus consultum ut Hannibali quat-
tuor milia Numidarum in supplementum mitterentur et quadraginta 
elephanti et †argenti talenta, †dictatorque cum Magone in Hispan-
iam praemissus est ad conducenda uiginti milia peditum, quattuor 
milia equitum, quibus exercitus qui in Italia quique in Hispania 
erant, supplerentur.
[Accordingly the senate with great unanimity decreed that four 
thousand Numidians should be sent to Hannibal as a reinforce-
ment; also forty elephants and ... silver talents. And ... was sent 
in advance to Spain with Mago, for the purpose of hiring twenty 
14  Polybius, The Histories, Vol. II: Books 3-4. Trans. W. R. Paton. Revised by F. W. 
Christian Habicht Walbank, Loeb Classical Library 137, Cambridge 2010.
15  Polyb. III 106-117; Liv. XXII 41-50. Fry 1897: 748-752.
16  Mago’s report in Liv. XXIII 11-13.
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thousand infantry and four thousand horse, to reinforce the 
armies that were in Italy and those in Spain.] Livy XXIII 13, 7-8.
The information available in the sources does not indicate that the aid 
arrived, for the situation in Hispania also required reinforcements from 
Carthage; thus, Mago was sent there, a fact to which we shall return later.
Hannibal, however, as we had mentioned before, continued on 
through Campania to the sea and gained access to a secure harbour; 
the sources tell us, however, that when Hannibal arrived at the coast 
near Neapolis, he found that Roman prefect Marcus Iunius Silanus 
had already arrived there in order to defend the city at the behest 
of its inhabitants, which thwarted Hannibal’s plans at the time and 
forced him to adapt to the new situation in which he found himself:
sub aduentum praetoris Romani Poenus agro Nolano excessit et ad mare 
proxime Neapolim descendit, cupidus maritimi oppidi potiundi, quo cursus 
nauibus tutus ex Africa esset; ceterum postquam Neapolim a praefecto 
Romano teneri accepit – M. Iunius Silanus erat, ab ipsis Neapolitanis acci-
tus – Neapoli quoque, sicut Nola, omissa petit Nuceriam.
[Upon the arrival of the Roman praetor, the Carthaginian left 
the territory of Nola and came down to the sea near Neapolis, 
desiring to gain possession of a coast town to which ships might 
have a safe passage from Africa. But on learning that Neapolis 
was held by a Roman prefect — it was Marcus Junius Silanus, 
who had been called in by the Neapolitans themselves — he 
turned aside from Neapolis also, as he had from Nola, and made 
for Nuceria.] Livy XXIII 15, 1-2.
This meant that the harbour was obstructed for the Carthaginians 
and that supplies and reinforcements from Carthage had to arrive 
from some other direction. Turning away from Neapolis back thro-
ugh Campania, however, with battles in the cities of Nuceria, Nola 
(again) and Acerrae, we find that Hannibal already leads a brigade 
of elephants at the Seige of Casilinum:
postremo Hannibal castris ante ipsa moenia oppositis paruam urbem 
paruumque praesidium summa ui atque omnibus copiis oppugnare 
parat, ac dum instat lacessitque corona undique circumdatis moenibus, 
aliquot milites et promptissimum quemque e muro turribusque ictos 
Tabula 17
54
Zbornik skupa Kultura Mare internum
amisit.semel ultro erumpentes agmine elephantorum opposito prope 
interclusit trepidosque compulit in urbem satis multis ut ex tanta pauci-
tate interfectis; plures cecidissent ni nox proelio interuenisset.
[Finally Hannibal pitched his camp directly before the walls and 
prepared to assault the small city and small garrison with the grea-
test violence and with all his forces. And while he was pressing the 
attack, the walls being completely encircled by his men, he lost a 
considerable number, the most active at that, being hit by missi-
les from the wall and the towers. When they actually sallied out 
once, he almost cut off their retreat by sending a column of elep-
hants against them, and drove them in alarm into the city, after a 
good number, for so small a force, had been slain. More would have 
fallen if night had not interrupted the battle.] Livy XXIII 18, 5-6.
It is not clear from where this brigade of elephants came. In the 
literature, this question is largely avoided.17 It is certain that it could 
not have arrived through Neapolis, as this is clearly confirmed in 
our sources. After the failed siege of Casilinum, Hannibal returned 
to winter in Capua. Thus, this brigade of elephants appears during 
the interval between the Battle of Cannae (in the summer of 216 
BC) and the end of the war season in the winter of the same year. 
This interval is important, as the elephants were obviously brou-
ght during this period through some harbor which would have been 
accessible to the Carthaginians, which is a factor which greatly limits 
the possibilities keeping in mind the repercussions of the First Punic 
War and the fact that the Roman fleet controlled the western and 
central Mediterranean.
In addition, Hannibal, in the first place, accepted a dangerous, risky 
land march towards Italy not only due of the element of surprise, 
which is certainly not negligible, but also due to the fact that there 
was no possibility of moving the army to Italy by sea because there 
was no harbour safe enough to receive them that was not contro-
17  “The elephants sent by order of the Carthaginian senate (xiii. 7) must have arri-
ved.” Livy History of Rome, transl. by Frank Gardner Moore, Loeb Classical Library, 
Harvard University Press 1960.
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lled by the Romans.18 Sources refer to the assistance requested by 
Mago of the Senate of Carthage at the aforementioned command 
of Hannibal after the Battle of Cannae in the following citation in 
which are described the forces of reinforcement for Hannibal that 
Mago prepared for the journey to Italy when circumstances on the 
theatre of war in Hispania led to a change in plans and a realloca-
tion of forces:
Interim Carthaginem, unde Mago, frater Hannibalis, duodecim milia 
peditum et mille quingentos equites, viginti elephantos, mille argenti 
talenta in Italiam transmissurus erat cum praesidio sexaginta navium 
longarum, nuntius adfertur in Hispania rem male gestam omnesque 
ferme eius provinciae populos ad Romanos defecisse.
[Meanwhile Carthage, from which Mago, Hannibal’s brother, was 
on the point of transporting into Italy twelve thousand infantry 
and fifteen hundred cavalry, twenty elephants and a thousand 
talents of silver, with a convoy of sixty warships, received the 
news that in Spain operations had failed and nearly all the tribes 
in that province had revolted to the Romans.] Livy XXIII 32, 5-7.
The developments in Spain, where the Scipioni19 were conducting 
a well-organized military campaign, resulted in Mago, as noted 
above, being sent with his troops to Spain, and the same amount 
of equipment and manpower was assigned to Hasdrubal, who was 
appointed commander of the forces of Sardinia, as can be seen 
from the following citation. One should keep in mind, however, 
that this happened in the year 215 BC, one year after the Battle of 
Cannae and the campaigns in Campania, which we have discussed, 
18  “Carthage may have ruled the waves for over 300 years, but since the disastrous 
defeat in the First Punic War the western Mediterranean had become a Roman sea. 
Indeed, the Punic fleet in Spain at the start of the Second Punic War consisted of 
only thirty-seven seaworthy quinqueremes and triremes. Between them Scipio and 
Longus had over three times that number of ships. Moreover, the Romans controlled 
many of the bases and much of the coastline by which any fleet would have had to 
pass in making its way from Spain to Italy” (Miles 2011: 84).
19  “The two Scipio brothers, Gnaeus and Publius, had landed in Spain and conducted a 
well-executed land and sea campaign. However, lacking the resources, they had been un-
able achieve anything decisive” (Bagnall 2002: 55). “Theater strategy is executed through 
campaigns that consist of operations synchronized in time and space. Rome successfully 
linked their operations in Italy, Iberia, Sicily, Macedonia, and eventually North Africa. 
Roman operations in Iberia and Sicily drew off reinforcements meant for Hannibal while 
Hannibal was isolated in southern Italy by surrounding Roman armies.” (Parker 2001: 25).
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and therefore could not chronologically affect the siege of Casili-
num described above, in which Hannibal used an elephant brigade.
... Magonem cum classe sua copiisque in Hispaniam mittunt, in 
Sardiniam Hasdrubalem deligunt ducem et tantum ferme copiarum 
quantum Magoni decernunt.
[... sent Mago with his fleet and his forces to Spain. For Sardinia 
they chose Hasdrubal as general, and voted him about the same 
number of troops as to Mago.] Livy XXIII 32, 11-12.
We must also point out here that Mago did not immediately leave 
for Carthage after separating from Hannibal at Compsa but stayed 
back in order to obey his command to take over the cities in the 
region which, some by grace and some by force, rebelled from Rome 
and crossed over to the side of the Carthaginians. From Mago’s 
report to the Senate of Carthage we learn that the Bruttians and 
Apulians and some of the Samnites and Lucanians had revolted to 
the Carthaginians and that Capua, the capital of Campania, had 
surrendered to Hannibal.20 This report from Mago is even more signi-
ficant insofar as it alludes to the possibility of supplies which were 
opened due to the defection, that is, that the reinforcements from 
Carthage could arrive through one of their harbours. Indeed, this is 
confirmed by our sources, but only of one such case with a positive 
outcome; in 215 BC the Locrians, after receiving supply ships from 
Carthage, prevented Roman ships from entering the port.
Per eosdem forte dies et Bomilcar cum militibus ad supplemen-
tum Carthagine missis elephantisque et commeatu Locros acces-
sit. Quem ut incautum opprimeret, Ap. Claudius per simulationem 
provinciae circumeundae Messanam raptim exercitu ducto vento 
aestuque suo Locros traiecit. Iam inde Bomilcar ad Hannonem in 
Bruttios profectus erat, et Locrenses portas Romanis clauserunt; 
Appius magno conatu nulla re gesta Messanam repetit.
20  Bruttios Apulosque, partem Samnitium ac Lucanorum defecisse ad Poenos. Capuam, 
quod caput non Campaniae modo sed post adflictam rem Romanam Cannensi pugna Italiae 
sit, Hannibali se tradidisse. Liv. XXIII 11, 11). Compare to the list of all the peoples of Italy 
who revolted and seceded from the Roman alliance, at one time or another during the 
war with Hannibal: Defecere autem ad Poenos hi populi: Campani, Atellani, Calatini, Hir-
pini, Apulorum pars, Samnites praeter Pentros, Bruttii omnes, Lucani, praeter hos Uzentini 
et Graecorum omnis ferme ora, Tarentini, Metapontini, Crotonienses Locrique, et Cisalpini 
omnes Galli. (Liv. XXII 61, 11-13).
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[About the same time, moreover, as it happened, Bomilcar 
arrived at Locri with the soldiers sent as reinforcements from 
Carthage and with elephants and supplies. In order to take him 
unawares Appius Claudius, with the pretence of making the 
round of his province, led his army in haste to Messana, and with 
wind and current in his favour crossed over to Locri. Already 
Bomilcar had left that place, to join Hanno among the Bruttii, 
and the Locrians closed their gates against the Romans. Appius, 
having accomplished nothing by his great effort, returned to 
Messana.] Livy XXIII 41, 10-12.
The entire operation was evidently well-planned and synchronized, 
for it is obvious in our sources that Hanno waited for Bomilcar with 
supplies so that he could join Hannibal, who had departed to besiege 
Nola, with reinforcements. This also indicates that Hannibal at the 
time had good communication with his native Carthage as well as 
with certain parts of his army. Of the elephants which were brou-
ght in this contingent, two were taken alive by the Romans during 
the Siege of Nola, while four were killed in the battle.21
Cum hoc responso muneribusque amplis legatos dimisit; ipse prae-
sidio modico relicto in Tifatis profectus cetero exercitu ire Nolam 
pergit. Eodem Hanno ex Bruttiis cum supplemento Carthagine 
advecto atque elephantis venit.
[With this answer and also with ample gifts he sent the amba-
ssadors away. He himself set out, leaving a moderate force on 
Tifata, and proceeded with the rest of his army to Nola. Hanno 
also came thither from the land of the Bruttii with reinforce-
ments brought from Carthage and with the elephants.] Livy 
XXIII, 43, 5-6.
In conclusion, all of the facts mentioned above do not offer 
an answer to the question of where the elephants of Hannibal 
used during the siege of Casilinum came from; also, the sources 
mentioned do not indicate how Hannibal managed to communi-
cate with Carthage and request reinforcements after the Battle 
of Lake Trasimene, having made his way to the sea after two years 
21  Hostium plus quinque milia caesa eo die, vivi capti sescenti et signa militaria undeviginti 
et duo elephanti, quattuor in acie occisi; Romanorum minus mille interfecti (Liv. XXIII, 46, 4).
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of military campaigns, concretely to the Adriatic coast. Given the 
timing and event sequence as seen in the sources, however, the 
elephants appearing at the siege of Casilinum must have been part 
of the contingent that came to Hannibal from Carthage in response 
to his very request.
THE LIBURNIANS
In the following section of this paper, we shall examine the sour-
ces cited above on Hannibal’s journey after the Battle of Lake Trasi-
mene from a strategic point of view. Namely, the Second Punic War 
was fought over a large portion of the Mediterranean, both on sea 
and on land, which required strategists from both sides to have a 
great capacity for coordination and, of course, open channels of 
communication. Hannibal’s strategic aim has been reconstructed 
after the fact in academic research on the basis of his movement and 
operations, both in antiquity and today.22 One significant element 
of such a reconstruction deals with the question of why Hannibal 
did not move directly towards Rome after the Battle of Lake Trasi-
mene, that is, why he went to Cannae. From the sources we disco-
ver the Romans, after receiving the news of their terrible defeat 
at the Battle of Lake Trasimene, began preparing defenses for the 
city right away as “they would have to fight for their City and their 
homes since they had not been able to save Italy”.23 From this we 
conclude that in antiquity they believed that such a move would 
have been both expected and logical on Hannibal’s part.
22  The question of “why Hannibal did not attack Rome after the Battle of Cannae” 
represents a topos in historiography, especially of martial history. Even in antiquity it 
was subject to strategic analysis and was considered a great mistake by the Cartha-
ginian general, as well as a later lapse in military discipline. “For sleep and wine, and 
feasts and harlots, and baths and idleness, which habit made daily more seductive, 
so weakened their bodies and spirits that it was their past victories rather than their 
present strength which thereafter protected them; and this was regarded among 
the military experts as a more serious failure in their commander than that he had 
not led his men from the field of Cannae forthwith to the city of Rome. For that de-
lay could be regarded as having merely retarded the victory, this mistake as having 
robbed him of the power to win” (Liv. XXIII 18, 12-13). “After such an overwhelming 
victory the question arises as to why Hannibal did not then march on Rome. Instead 
he continued to try to bring about the dissolution of the Roman Confederation. 
Many explanations are possible, but even with hindsight it would be unwise to pass 
judgment on a complex decision about which we only have the most rudimentary 
knowledge” (Bagnall 2002:55).
23  Pro urbe ac penatibus dimicandum esse quando Italiam tueri nequissent (Liv. XXII 8, 7).
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Hannibal, however, went in the other direction, to the Adriatic 
Sea, to the territory of Picenum. In the citation by Polybius cited 
above, Polybius clearly states that, as we have already mentioned, 
Hannibal sent a messenger by sea to Carthage as soon as he arrived 
at the Adriatic coast and asked for reinforcements. Polybius thus 
enlightens Hannibal’s move after Trasimene, for he had wished to 
get to the sea so that he could communicate with Carthage. Seeing 
as Rome controlled maritime passages, the question arises of whom 
Hannibal counted on with regard to transport.
We don’t have any information on this in literary sources, but here 
we must point out the coincidental fact that on the other side of 
the Adriatic, in which archeological findings from the Liburnia-Iapodia 
region show an enormous amount of Carthaginian and North African 
coins dating back to the Second Punic War. As Šešelj and Ilkić show in 
their study24 on the typology and spatial distribution of these findings 
found in 30 Liburnian native settlements, the greatest concentration 
is in the region that was most densely populated during the Helleni-
stic era; with regard to typology, the most common type of coin is of 
late Carthaginian origin, dating to the second half of the 3rd and the 
first half of 2nd century BC, depicting the head of Tanit or Persephone, 
with a horse facing to the right, or with the horse facing to the right 
with its head turned. The authors conclude that “there is no doubt that 
the occurrence of this coinage must be related to Liburnian maritime 
trade. Relations with the western coast of the Adriatic, especially the 
area of Picenum and Apulia, were well established from the early Iron 
Age onwards and persisted during the Hellenistic period”.25 
Archeological findings of coins from Cape Ploča, where a votive 
sanctuary for sailors sailing on route through Liburnian waters is found, 
show the same typological picture.26 Furthermore, the fact that among 
the coins found in Liburnia-Iapodia there are also coins from Apulian 
cities (Luceria, Teate, Arpi) which otherwise aren’t widely found outside 
of Italy, and which also date from the time of the Second Punic War; 
to these should be added findings of coins from more southern points, 
such as Bruttium and Brundisium, is of incredible importance to us. 
24  Šešelj – Ilkić 2014: 43-54.
25  Eidem: 50.
26  Ibidem. On maritime routes see Arnaud 2005. On the results of the archeological ex-
cavations on Ploče see Bilić-Dujmušić 2002: 485-497. and Bilić-Dujmušić 2004: 123-140.
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Keeping this in mind, we believe that the Liburnians must have played 
some sort of role in trade or communications with Carthage from the 
moment that Hannibal arrived at the Adriatic coast after the Battle of 
Lake Trasimene (as stated above by Polybius), aiding him in establishing 
communications with Carthage, in other words, that the Liburnians 
offered the support in maritime transport which he had been coun-
ting on. With regard to provenance the findings of coins also coincide 
with Hannibal’s movement to the south, as has been described in lite-
rary sources.27 Furthermore, Cannae itself, along with the fact that at 
that time it was a large grain storage area and thus a military target, 
was near (which was important to Hannibal) the harbour of Aufidusa, 
one of the rare suitable harbours upon which Hannibal could count to 
be less protected than more northern harbours, such as Ariminum.28
In conclusion, it is due to the reasons examined here that we believe 
that Hannibal’s journey to Cannae after the Battle of Lake Trasimene 
was part of a premeditated military plan in which, in order to secure 
a channel of communication with his mother country, Carthage, and 
consequently the delivery of the reinforcements, he counted on the 
Liburnians taking on a significant role. Whether this could explain the 
appearance of elephants during the siege of Casilinum remains to be 
explored, as are, among others, the possibilities of transporting them, 
which, when it comes to elephants, are specific and extremely deman-
ding.29 Furthermore, political entities on the eastern Adriatic coast 
conducted anti-Roman policies during the Second Punic War, in coor-
dination with Macedonia among others; Macedonia, in fact, became 
Hannibal's ally,30 and entered a war with Rome in 214 AD. Keeping this 
in mind when viewing the wider context from the aforementioned posi-
tion, one should also keep in mind the fact that there were two Illyrian 
wars just before and just after the war with Hannibal.
27  “… Hannibal now shifting his camp from time to time continued to remain in the 
country near the Adriatic.” Polyb. III 88, 1. Polybius 2010.
28  “Central to Roman strategy was the critical advantage of Roman sea suprema-
cy. Their ability to control the sea lines of communication of central and western 
Mediterranean enabled them to move and resupply large forces at will. The Romans 
maintained this advantage throughout the war and they were quickly able to respond 
to problems arising in distant areas. This stands in marked contrast with Carthaginian 
naval efforts. Carthage possessed a potent naval force but never successfully deployed 
it against the Romans” (Parker 2001: 14).
29  Nossov: 2008.
30  Miles: 2010.
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CONCLUSION
The problem with the elephants which Hannibal brought with 
him to the Siege of Casilinum in this paper has shown itself to be 
one part of a much wider problem, that of the channel of commu-
nications between Hannibal and his native Carthage, the channels 
of transportation and reinforcements which arrived from Carthage. 
An analysis of literary sources has shown that they themselves are 
not sufficient for a complete understanding of the system of opera-
tions, but they do point to a possible explanation for the strategic 
moves of Hannibal after the Battle at Lake Trasimene and open the 
possibility of deliberating a transport-trade-communication relati-
onship between Hannibal, the Liburnians, and Carthage. The thesis 
is further strengthened by the numismatic situation on the other 
side of the Adriatic in Liburnia-Iapodia, in which during the time 
of the Second Punic War a large quantity of coins from Carthage 
are in circulation in a large number of settlements in the region. 
The context provided opens additional possibilities for interpreta-
tion as well as the need for further research regarding communica-
tion, transportation options and techniques, and their place in the 
context of the anti-Roman political coalition's operations during 
the Second Punic War.
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Figure 1. Areal distribution of coins. Taken from: ŠEŠELJ – ILKIĆ 2014: 45.
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Figure 2 Typological distribution of coins. Taken from: ŠEŠELJ – ILKIĆ 2014: 45 
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SUMMARY
Hannibal’s Elephants and the Liburnians
The second Punic war is a relatively well-known episode from Roman 
history. Reliable, detailed ancient sources such as Livy and Polybius, 
however, don’t say much on the topic of Hannibal’s provisions from 
his native Carthage. One of the questions related to the provisions is 
where Hannibal’s elephants came from after the battle of Cannae, as 
after traversing the Etrurian swamp Hannibal only had one elephant 
left (Livy XXII 2). Immediately after the victory at Cannae Hannibal 
sends a delegation requesting logistics and the Carthaginian senate 
decides to send him military aid, among which were 4000 Numidians 
and 40 elephants (Livy XXIII 11-13). In the meantime, Hannibal pene-
trates Campania already accompanied by elephants at the Siege of 
Casilinum (Livy XXIII 18).
The authors of this paper believe that Hannibal’s path to Cannae 
was part of a premeditated military plan, according to which the 
Carthaginian army needed to pick up supplies near Cannae, with the 
Liburnians playing an important role in opening channels of commu-
nication and supplies. Several facts support this theory, most impor-
tantly the following:
 – one of the few suitable ports that Hannibal could count upon to 
be less guarded by the Romans than more northern ports, such 
as Ariminum, is found near Cannae;
 – an enormous amount of money from Africa is in circulation in 
Liburnia right at the time of the war with Hannibal;
It is known that political entities on the eastern coast of the Adria-
tic had an anti-Roman political agenda during the time of the second 
Punic war, coordinating themselves with Macedonia among others, 
which became an ally of Hannibal and with which Rome went to war 
in 214 B.C, with which the two Illyrian wars right before and right after 
the war with Hannibal are related. The authors believe that the sour-
ces point to a sort of coalition for transport, trade and communica-
tion between Hannibal, the Liburnians and Carthage, which should be 
viewed in the context of the operations of the anti-Roman coalition 
of political entities on the eastern shores of the Adriatic.
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SAŽETAK
Hanibalovi slonovi i Liburni
Drugi punski rat relativno je dobro poznata epizoda iz rimske povijesti. 
Ipak, inače pouzdani, pa i dosta detaljni antički izvori – prije svega Livije 
i Polibije – ne govore detaljno o Hanibalovoj komunikaciji i opskrbi iz 
matične Kartage. Jedno od pitanja vezanih uz opskrbu je odakle Hani-
balu slonovi nakon bitke kod Kane. Naime, nakon prolaska kroz etrur-
ske močvare Hanibalu je ostao samo jedan slon (Livije XXII 2). Odmah 
nakon pobjede kod Kane, Hanibal u Kartagu šalje izaslanstvo s molbom 
za logistiku i kartaški senat mu odluči poslati vojnu pomoć, među osta-
lim 4000 Numiđana i 40 slonova (Livije XXIII 11-13). U međuvremenu 
Hanibal prodire u Kampaniju i tamo već u opsadi Casilinuma ima slonove 
(Livije XXIII 18).
Autori članka smatraju da je Hanibalov put jadranskom obalom prema 
Kani, nakon bitke kod Trazimenskoga jezera, dio unaprijed smišljenoga 
vojnog plana, prema kojem se kartaška vojska trebala opskrbiti upravo 
kod Kane, i da su pritom u ostvarivanju komunikacije i opskrbljivanju 
značajnu ulogu trebali odigrati Liburni. Tomu u prilog govori nekoliko 
činjenica, prije svega ove:
 – kod Kane je jedna od rijetkih prikladnih luka za koje je Hanibal 
mogao računati da će ih Rimljani manje štititi nego sjevernije 
luke, npr. Ariminij;
 – na području Liburnije upravo u vrijeme rata s Hanibalom kola 
iznimno mnogo afričkoga novca.
Autorice smatraju da izvori upućuju na svojevrstan saveznički tran-
sportno-trgovinsko-komunikacijski odnos između Hanibala, Liburna i 
Kartage koji treba dodatno sagledati u kontekstu djelovanja proturim-
ske koalicije političkih tvorevina na istočnoj obali Jadrana.
Ključne riječi: Hanibal, Liburnija, Livije, Polibije, Drugi punski rat, 
opskrba, slonovi
